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1. Introduction
Accounting standard-setters have been wrestling
with the issue of how to account for pensions and
other retirement benefits for several decades. The
International Accounting Standards Committee
(IASC) included the issue of how employers should
account for retirement benefits on their agenda in
1977, three years after the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) had begun a ‘massive
project’ on pension accounting (Camfferman and
Zeff, 2006: 119). The fact that we are still dis-
cussing how to account for pensions in employers’
financial statements 30 years later is evidence of
the difficulties that standard-setters have faced in
understanding the changing nature of pension
arrangements and the legal and social contexts in
which they operate, and in translating this under-
standing into an operational and effective account-
ing standard. Along the way, standard-setters have
made compromises to be able to develop standards
that would be acceptable to preparers and users,
but compromises have a tendency to return and
haunt the standard-setting bodies. Does this mean
that there is something intrinsic to retirement ben-
efits that makes it difficult for standard-setters to
arrive at solutions acceptable and workable in the
long term? In this paper, I suggest that this is the
case to some extent – pensions and other retire-
ment benefits represent complex arrangements
that fit uneasily into the standard categories of fi-
nancial reporting. However, standard-setters have
also had to work against a changing background of
state regulation of retirement arrangements, which
have reformed pensions in often unforeseen ways.
Moreover, financial reporting and its conceptual
foundations have not remained static during the
past 30 years, and the different approaches to ac-
counting for retirement benefits that have been ad-
vocated during this period reflect the dominant
accounting ideas of their time, and hence appear to
be outdated as these dominant ideas change. Most
notably, as the main focus of financial reporting (at
least to standard-setters) has shifted from the de-
termination of income or profit to the identifica-
tion, measurement and recognition of assets and
liabilities, so ‘accounting for the cost of pensions’
(Napier, 1983) has been overtaken by ‘rethinking
pension liabilities’ (Ryan and Fabozzi, 2002).
When the IASC Foundation, the parent body of
the International Accounting Standards Board
(IASB), set out its constitution, it chose as its pri-
mary objective:
‘To develop, in the public interest, a single set of
high quality, understandable and enforceable
global accounting standards that require high
quality, transparent and comparable information
in financial statements and other financial re-
porting to help participants in the world’s capital
markets and other users to make economic deci-
sions.’ (IASC Foundation, 2002, para. 2(a))
How can a standard-setter tell whether the goal
of producing standards that provide these qualities
has been achieved? In other words, what makes a
standard ‘high quality’? One approach focuses on
the way in which information prepared in accor-
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dance with standards is used in practice, but as ac-
tual use may be difficult to observe, researchers
may assess quality by investigating the extent to
which information in financial statements helps to
‘explain’, in a statistical sense, the values attrib-
uted to company securities by capital markets.
This is referred to as ‘value relevance’ research.1
Another approach considers the effects or conse-
quences of particular accounting treatments on the
actions of managers and others. A standard that
seems to encourage particular actions or deter oth-
ers may be considered ‘high quality’ by those who
support the consequences alleged to flow from the
preparation and use of financial statements com-
piled in accordance with the standard, while those
who dislike or oppose the claimed consequences
are more likely to challenge the standard (Zeff,
1978).
Standard-setters may not be able to study the
value relevance of proposed recognition, measure-
ment and disclosure standards if these introduce
new accounting requirements or imply significant
changes to existing requirements. At the same
time, standard-setters, at least in their public pro-
nouncements, stress that their role in developing
standards is to ‘tell it as it is’ (Tweedie, 2007: 7),
while ignoring, or at least giving little credence 
to, claims that a proposal would have ‘adverse 
economic consequences’ (Tweedie, 2005). So a
high quality standard would be one that succeeds
in ‘telling it as it is’, that is, it leads to accounts
that faithfully represent the underlying economic
and commercial phenomena that the standard 
addresses.
How do standard-setters decide that a particular
standard will lead to accounts providing such a
faithful representation? This poses a challenge to
some theorists of financial reporting (for example,
Hines, 1988; Macintosh et al., 2000; Macintosh,
2002), who ask whether ‘telling it as it is’ can be
possible in the straightforward sense that many ac-
counting standard-setters seem to imply. Standard-
setters need to ensure that any standard is
consistent with a conceptual framework or state-
ment of principles. Modern standard setting is at
least, in part, a deductive process, where the con-
cepts enunciated in a pre-existing framework are
applied to a specific situation to ‘tell it as it is’. A
high quality standard is thus one that achieves the
goal of faithful representation within the conceptu-
al framework.
Attempts to develop accounting standards for re-
tirement benefits, in particular pensions, have re-
flected the main conceptual assumptions in place
at the time the standards emerged. In particular,
early pronouncements reflected an emphasis on
cost measurement, while more recently the focus
has been on the determination and measurement of
liabilities and assets, with pension expense emerg-
ing as a by-product. I begin by reviewing early
pension accounting standards based on the desire
to measure pension cost appropriately. Next, I look
at the shift to determining the pension liability,
first deciding what the liability is, and then how to
measure that liability. I then consider the effect
that assets dedicated to the payment of pensions
have on the liability, whether these assets are held
directly by the employer or through an investment
vehicle such as a pension fund. Finally, I review
how accounting for liabilities and assets affects the
determination of pension expense, and conclude
with some brief remarks on disclosure.
2. Pensions as an expense
2.1. Early approaches to pension accounting
In the USA and UK, private-sector employer-
sponsored pension arrangements began to appear
in the second half of the 19th century, and were
often associated with large organisations such as
railways, insurance companies and banks
(Hannah, 1986: 10–12; Chandar and Miranti,
2007: 206). Accounting for these arrangements
was often very simple. The cost recognised by the
employer was effectively the cash paid in a given
period. Some schemes operated on a ‘pay-as-you-
go’ basis, where the employer made no advance
provision for retirement benefits. In this case, the
cost each period equalled the benefits paid. In a
scheme where the employer made contributions to
an external fund invested in securities, out of
which benefits would be paid, or made notional
contributions to an internal account, the cost
would be the contributions arising in each period,
possibly augmented by interest on notional contri-
butions if these were not used to purchase securi-
ties. However, many employers granted pensions
to enable employees to retire, even though no ad-
vance provision had been made.
The ‘expense-as-you-pay’ accounting for pen-
sions was rationalised through the ‘gratuity theo-
ry’ of retirement benefits (McGill et al., 2004: 16).
This theory proposed that retirement benefits were
awarded to retirees at the discretion of the employ-
er, ‘as a kindly act on the part of an employer to-
wards old retainers who have served him faithfully
and well’ (Pilch and Wood, 1979: 2). Paying a pen-
sion was not necessarily an act of pure benevo-
lence, because it could allow an employer to retire
an employee who was no longer performing ade-
quately, without incurring public criticism. The
gratuity theory implied that the employer received
an efficiency gain when superannuated employees
retired, and that the appropriate point at which to
recognise the cost of pensions was as the pensions
232 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 The significance of ‘value relevance’ research has been
defended in detail by Barth et al. (2001), a response to criti-
cism of the approach from Holthausen and Watts (2001).
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were paid. If the employer wanted to earmark
some earnings in a distinct pension reserve before
employees retired, then this would be regarded as
an appropriation of profit rather than as an ex-
pense. Even in structured pension schemes, the
employer might include clauses denying the exis-
tence of an enforceable contract, stressing that
pension benefits were paid entirely at the employ-
er’s discretion and could be discontinued at any
time (Stone, 1984: 24).
However, the gratuity theory rapidly came under
challenge from the view that pensions constitute
‘deferred pay’, and that employees in effect sacri-
fice current income in exchange for the expecta-
tion of income in the future. On this basis, early
accounting theorists such as Henry Rand Hatfield
suggested that employers should include in operat-
ing expenses ‘the amount necessary to provide for
future pensions’ (Hatfield, 1916: 194). A number
of commentators observed that the calculation of
such an expense was potentially highly complex,
but they suggested that the calculations fell within
the domain of actuaries (Stone, 1984: 26).
Members of the actuarial profession had already
been involved in advising on appropriate contribu-
tion rates for pension schemes involving either ex-
ternal or internal ‘notional’ funding. In accounting
terms, the employer would measure the annual
cost of pension provision either directly in terms of
amounts calculated by actuaries, if the route of in-
ternal funding was followed, or through the contri-
butions (themselves determined by actuaries) to an
external pension fund. In the case of external fund-
ing, cost would be equal to contributions due for
the period, and, other than short-term accruals,
pension expense would be based on cash payments
(or other assets transferred) to the pension fund.
2.2. The beginnings of accounting regulation
Early authoritative accounting pronouncements
endorsed this essentially cash-based approach to
pension cost determination. The Committee on
Accounting Procedure of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) issued
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 47 Accounting
for Costs of Pension Plans in 1956, and expressed
the view that ‘costs based on current and future
services should be systematically accrued during
the expected period of active service of the cov-
ered employees’ (CAP, 1956). On closer analysis,
‘systematic accrual’ implied that employers would
use the method recommended by the actuary for
funding the pension plan to determine the pension
expense in respect of current service. This ap-
proach was endorsed by the Accounting Principles
Board (APB) in their Opinion No. 8 Accounting
for the Cost of Pension Plans, issued in 1966. 
APB 8 is entirely cost-based – there are references
to ‘balance-sheet pension accruals’ and ‘balance-
sheet pension prepayments or deferred charges’,
but no explanation of these terms or how they are
to be determined. Much of the Opinion addresses
not the issue of determining ‘normal cost’ (‘the an-
nual cost assigned, under the actuarial cost method
in use, to years subsequent to the inception of a
pension plan or to a particular valuation date’) but
rather ‘past service cost’ (‘pension cost assigned,
under the actuarial cost method in use, to years
prior to the inception of a pension plan’) and ‘prior
service cost’ (‘pension cost assigned, under the ac-
tuarial cost method in use, to years prior to the date
of a particular actuarial valuation’). The Opinion
goes to great lengths to provide guidance on how
these components of pension cost should be recog-
nised, recommending spreading of the costs over a
period up to 40 years.
A number of features of the accounting treat-
ment of pension costs need to be highlighted. First,
although it is not made explicit, there is an under-
lying desire to arrive at a pension expense in each
period that is not materially different from the em-
ployer’s contributions to the pension fund. APB 8
notes ‘the amount of the pension cost determined
under this Opinion may vary from the amount
funded’ (APB, 1966: para. 43), but this situation is
not analysed in detail. For unfunded pension plans,
costs are to be determined using an actuarial cost
method. The criteria for the selection of an appro-
priate actuarial cost method are that the method is
‘rational and systematic and should be consistent-
ly applied so that it results in a reasonable measure
of pension cost from year to year’ (para. 23), and
several methods commonly used at that time in the
USA for determining pension funding are en-
dorsed as meeting the criteria. Second, there is an
emphasis on avoiding short-term fluctuations, so
extensive use of cost-spreading is supported. This
applies particularly to actuarial gains and losses.
APB 8 recognises that, given the need for actuar-
ies to make a range of estimates in arriving at their
cost or funding recommendations, differences be-
tween original estimates and actual outcomes (or
revised estimates) need to be dealt with. The
Opinion recommends that the accounting impact
of actuarial gains and losses should be accounted
for by spreading them over a period of between 10
and 20 years or by adjusting the normal cost by an
estimate of the average actuarial gains and losses
arising over several years. Third, the Opinion
makes a distinction between defined-benefit and
defined-contribution plans and suggests different
accounting approaches for the two types of plan.
Fourth, the Opinion provides no theoretical ration-
ale for its recommendations, while basing some
provisions on the accidents of current US tax prac-
tices.
The cost approach to pension accounting was
not surprising at a time when the main objective of
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 233
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financial reporting was considered to be the deter-
mination of an entity’s periodic income, and ac-
counting problems centred on the timing of
revenue recognition and the matching of costs with
revenues. Accounting for most costs involved ei-
ther the recognition of cash payments during a
given period, adjusted for short-term accruals, or
the systematic allocation over several periods of a
known or straightforwardly estimated amount.
Cost-based pension accounting combined these as-
pects. The main accounting problem was not per-
ceived to be ‘normal pension cost’ but rather ‘past
service cost’, which arose typically when a pen-
sion plan was introduced or substantially im-
proved and employees were granted benefits
retrospectively. From the 1940s to the 1970s, in
countries where external funding through employ-
er-sponsored pension plans was the norm, new and
improved schemes tended to be defined-benefit in
form.2 In other countries, state provision for retire-
ment often took care of the needs of the majority
of the population, and private saving rather than
employer provision was more likely to be favoured
by higher earners.
2.3. A search for conceptual foundations
A sense that the cost approach lacked a firm
foundation was expressed by Dewhirst (1971), in
one of the earliest papers on pension accounting in
the academic literature. Dewhirst’s view was that
actuarial funding methods were developed for a
specific purpose – determining a systematic con-
tribution to an external pension plan that would,
over time, cover the benefits paid out by the plan.
Different funding methods led to different patterns
of contributions, and also to different levels of
funding, but these were financing choices for the
employer. Dewhirst instead proposed basing pen-
sion cost on the ‘work-life pattern (timing) of em-
ployee labour services exchanged for pension
benefits’ (Dewhirst, 1971: 366). He envisaged that
the total package of benefits accrued by each indi-
vidual employee was earned by the total services
provided over the employee’s working life with
the employer, and the pension cost each period
should be determined by allocating the total cost of
providing the benefits in proportion to the labour
services provided each period. Dewhirst thought
that this allocation could reflect patterns of effi-
ciency among the employees.
Underlying Dewhirst’s ideas is what Napier
(1983: 34–44) was subsequently to refer to as 
the ‘pension exchange’. Cost-based accounting for
pensions will focus on the exchange transaction
between the employer and the employee. This
means that it is necessary to characterise what the
employer is giving and what the employee is giv-
ing to achieve the exchange. Napier (1983: 34)
suggested that ‘the employer’s side of the pension
exchange is the promise to pay benefits’. The em-
ployee’s side of the exchange was more difficult to
characterise. Napier (1983: 35) noted that ‘the em-
ployee is foregoing remuneration or providing
services’, but commented that ‘it would be hard to
identify, let alone value, the marginal labour serv-
ices which an employee provides as a result of the
employer’s pension promise [while] it rarely hap-
pens that employees are faced with the choice be-
tween current remuneration and pension
provision.’ Napier concluded that ‘measurement of
the remuneration foregone in exchange for the
pension promise would involve the accountant in
assessing imaginary events or transactions.’
Accounting does not develop in a vacuum, and
external factors had an impact on accounting for
pensions. In the USA, growing concerns about the
extent to which employer-sponsored pension
schemes were financially secure led to the passing
in 1974 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). This established that em-
ployers sponsoring pension plans were financially
responsible for the obligations of the plans, and 
established the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) to insure defined benefit
plans. In the UK, the stock market decline of 1974,
coupled with abnormally high price inflation, left
many pension funds requiring additional contribu-
tions from employers to cover deficits on actuarial
valuations. Pension accounting became a matter of
concern to accounting standard-setters.
An initial effect of this was a demand for re-
search. The Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants (CICA) commissioned T. Ross
Archibald, who worked for Price Waterhouse, to
investigate the issue, and his research report,
Accounting for Pension Costs and Liabilities (A
Reconciliation of Accounting and Funding
Practice) (Archibald, 1980), provided a manual of
actuarial practice for accountants. Archibald’s re-
port is copiously illustrated with graphs, charts and
complex spreadsheets, which show how pension
costs determined in accordance with a range of ac-
tuarial methods would evolve over several
decades. Archibald aimed at eliminating certain
actuarial methods that he considered were incon-
sistent with ‘proper accounting’. Although he did
not specify a particular method as desirable in all
cases, he favoured a method that he labelled
‘ABVM/K$B’ (accrued benefit valuation method
with constant dollar benefit) (Archibald, 1980:
182). Archibald also endorsed the use of final
salary projections for defined benefit schemes
234 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
2 In 1981, for example, in the UK, about 90% of schemes
surveyed by the National Association of Pension Funds were
final salary or final average salary schemes (Napier, 1983: 13).
Many of these had been established or extended to the whole
workforce of particular enterprises since the end of the Second
World War.
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where the pension benefits are based on salaries at
or close to retirement, arguing:
‘[T]he final pension benefit and presumably the
costs associated are not based on any interim
salary but based on the final amount as calculat-
ed on the base of the number of years of service.
Such a reality may be difficult to accept but the
fact remains that this is the outcome of the pen-
sion promise in final pay plans.’ (Archibald,
1980: 173)
The UK study on pension accounting,
Accounting for the Cost of Pensions (Napier,
1983) follows a similar line of argument to that of
Archibald. Having rejected the idea of measuring
pension cost directly in terms of foregone salaries
or incremental labour services, Napier (1983: 36)
concludes that possible contenders for the concep-
tually sound method of determining pension cost
are: (a) the contributions due to the pension fund in
the period; (b) the increase in the employees’ cur-
rent rights to benefits; and (c) the increase in the
employees’ expectations of benefits. Leaving aside
issues of how current rights are determined, the
main difference between options (b) and (c) is that
current rights are determined by reference to cur-
rent pay levels while expectations reflect future
pay levels on which the amounts of benefits will
depend. Napier pursued this idea of focusing on li-
abilities, and identified what he called the ‘accrued
expectations liability’ – option (c) – with
Archibald’s preferred method. He also noted that
this method was usually referred to as the ‘project-
ed unit credit method’ by actuaries. However, at
this stage, Napier backed away from pursuing a li-
ability approach, observing that he did not ‘consid-
er that the accrued expectations liability is
significantly better for the purposes of measuring
accounting liability and pension expense than the
particular actuarial funding method used by the
employer, on which the employer’s cash flows de-
pend’ (Napier, 1983: 114). Not all actuarial fund-
ing methods were acceptable, however, given the
fundamental accounting concepts of ‘going con-
cern’ and ‘accruals’. Acceptable methods involved
recognising cost over employees’ working lives
for an employer, and also required salaries to be
projected. In practice, however, most actuarial
methods in use in the UK at that time satisfied
these requirements.
2.4. Compromise on costs and the cost of 
compromise
This compromise approach was to be reflected
in the first UK accounting standard on pensions,
SSAP 24 Accounting for Pension Costs (ASC,
1988). SSAP 24’s requirements are remarkably
similar to those of APB No. 8. The standard focus-
es almost entirely on determining costs, with a sin-
gle paragraph (para. 86) on the balance sheet. The
core of the standard is the ‘accounting objective’:
‘From the point of view of the employee a pen-
sion may be regarded as deferred remuneration;
from the point of view of the employer it is part
of the cost incurred in obtaining the employee’s
services. The accounting objective therefore re-
quires the employer to recognise the cost of pro-
viding pensions on a systematic and rational
basis over the period during which he benefits
from the employees’ services. Many companies
have, until now, simply charged the contribu-
tions payable to the pension scheme as the pen-
sion cost in each accounting period. In future, to
comply with this Statement, it will be necessary
to consider whether the funding plan provides a
satisfactory basis for allocating the pension cost
to particular accounting periods.’ (SSAP 24,
para. 16)
Implicit in this was the belief that, for most em-
ployers, the funding plan would indeed turn out to
be a satisfactory basis.
Two features of SSAP 24 were potential ‘mines’
waiting to blow up in future years. The first of
these were the assumptions to be used in determin-
ing the pension cost, which were required to lead
to ‘the actuary’s best estimate of the cost of pro-
viding the benefits promised’ (SSAP 24, para. 79,
emphasis added). This allowed the accounting cal-
culations of the ‘regular’ pension cost to be based
on different assumptions from those underpinning
the actuary’s calculations of contributions. Pension
cost in a given period could vary substantially
from pension contributions, leading to amounts
appearing on the employer’s balance sheet. The
other feature was the treatment of so-called ‘expe-
rience surpluses and deficiencies’, which would
now be called ‘actuarial gains and losses’. These,
and other ‘variations from regular cost’, were to be
allocated over the ‘expected remaining service
lives of current employees in the scheme’ (SSAP
24, para. 80). Napier (1983: 137–138) suggested
that experience deficiencies (actuarial losses)
should be recognised immediately in the income
statement and as liabilities on the balance sheet in
respect of the additional funding that such defi-
ciencies would require. Experience surpluses (ac-
tuarial gains) could be recognised as assets if they
would be ‘realised’ through lower contributions
over a short term. However, by treating actuarial
gains and losses as part of a general class of ‘vari-
ations from regular cost’, SSAP 24 led to spread-
ing and smoothing.
As already noted, compromises come back to
haunt standard-setters. With the rise in security
values in the early 1980s, the fall in inflation and
increases in labour turnover, many schemes that
had been in deficit a few years earlier were now
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 235
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showing surpluses (Napier, 1986). Faced with
pressure from the tax authorities to reduce surplus-
es, companies began taking ‘contribution holi-
days’, reducing or even dispensing altogether with
contributions to the pension scheme and meeting
benefits out of earnings on the scheme’s invest-
ments. In this situation, SSAP 24 could easily pro-
duce measures of pension cost that were virtually
impossible to interpret. For example, a company
paying nothing into the pension fund for several
years could show a net cost (because the ‘regular
cost’ would go on being recorded) or even a net
gain (if the spreading of the ‘variations from regu-
lar cost’ resulted in a greater credit in a given year
than the debit from the regular cost). The balance
sheet could show a liability when the scheme was
in surplus and an asset when the scheme was in
deficit. The cost of the compromise represented by
SSAP 24 was that a logical basis for financial re-
porting had been sacrificed, and hence SSAP 24
turned out not to be ‘high quality’.
3. Pensions as a liability
3.1. A different starting point
Alongside the studies by Archibald (1980) 
and Napier (1983), the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) published a Discussion
Memorandum Employers’ Accounting for
Pensions and Other Postemployment Benefits
(FASB, 1981). This document aimed to raise ques-
tions as much as supply answers. Unlike the other
studies, the FASB’s Discussion Memorandum be-
gins by asking the question: ‘what is the liability
relating to pensions that the employer should
recognise in the financial statements?’ It then ad-
dresses pension expense, and gives an indication
that the preferred possibility would be to attribute
the cost of an employee’s pension ‘to periods of
the employee’s service in some systematic and ra-
tional way in order to determine the liability (if
any) and the expense’ (FASB, 1981: para. 52). The
method of attribution is seen as a measurement
issue, and the usual actuarial funding methods are
exposed for consideration. Options are presented
for measuring gains and losses, assets and liabili-
ties that might arise through changes in the pen-
sion plan and through actuarial gains and losses,
and the degree to which employers’ accounting for
pensions carried over to accounting for other re-
tirement benefits, such as retirees’ health insur-
ance, is addressed.
The FASB Discussion Memorandum did not
provide explicit recommendations, but it set out
the issues clearly. Several of the questions it posed
are still being asked (for example, by the Pro-
Active Accounting Activities in Europe – PAAinE
– initiative: PAAinE, 2008). In the accounting
standard that followed, SFAS No. 87 (FASB,
1985), the FASB anticipated the behaviour of the
ASC in Britain and compromised. In a standard
approved by the Board by a bare 4–3 margin,3 the
regular ‘service cost’ was calculated by attributing
units of benefit to periods of service in line with
the pension benefit formula. Benefits were to be
estimated using ‘future compensation levels’
(para. 46), and these were also taken into account
in measuring the ‘projected benefit obligation’
(PBO), defined as: ‘The actuarial present value as
of a date of all benefits attributed by the pension
benefit formula to employee service rendered prior
to that date. The projected benefit obligation is
measured using assumptions as to future compen-
sation levels if the pension benefit formula is
based on those future compensation levels’ (FASB,
1985: 104). Other elements in the income state-
ment were the interest arising on the PBO during
the year, returns on plan assets, past and prior serv-
ice costs, and actuarial gains and losses, the latter
being spread rather than recognised immediately.
However, as well as having to consider the possi-
bility of assets and liabilities arising because
amounts contributed up to the balance sheet date
were likely to differ from amounts recognised as
net pension expense, SFAS No. 87 also required
that the minimum liability recognised should be
equal to the amount by which the fund assets
(measured at fair value) fell short not of the PBO
but rather of the ‘accumulated benefit obligation’
(ABO), determined on effectively the same basis
as the PBO but without allowing for future salary
increases. The FASB thus built into its pension
standard a series of inconsistencies and smoothing
devices that would lead to anomalous income
statement and balance sheet numbers.
The disclosure of different potential measures of
pension liability provided an opportunity for re-
search into which measure appeared to be best as-
sociated with market valuations of corporate
equity (Daley, 1984; Landsman, 1986; Barth,
1991), with the PBO being generally favoured
over other liability measures. Some support for
this outcome came from contemporaneous re-
search in the field of labour economics, with
Ippolito suggesting that there was an ‘implicit con-
tract’ between workers and their employer under
which ‘workers anticipating careers with a firm
will consider the package of wage and pension
benefits they expect to collect over their life cycle’
(Ippolito, 1985: 1031). Workers would take into
account, and current remuneration would reflect,
pension expectations based on final salaries (if
these were incorporated into the benefit formula)
rather than the lesser pension expectations, based
at best on current salaries, that would accrue to
236 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
3 Two members, Victor Brown and Robert Sprouse, thought
that SFAS No. 87 was too radical, while one member, Arthur
Wyatt, thought it was not radical enough.
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workers if the employer were to terminate the pen-
sion plan immediately. Ippolito found support for
the implicit contract view from an examination of
career pay patterns for members of defined benefit
schemes, but his data related to US employees re-
tiring in the period 1967–1977, which are unlikely
to be representative of more recent pay patterns.
The FASB compromised on the issue of whether
accounting measures should try to reflect such
suggested ‘implicit contracts’ or should be based
on a literal reading of the employment contract
within the current system of pension law and reg-
ulation (advocated by economists such as Bulow,
1982) in SFAS No. 87, since the measurement of
service cost and the spreading of variations reflect-
ed the implicit contract while the measurement of
liabilities was closer to a legal approach.
3.2. Moving closer to a pure liability approach
The original International Accounting Standard
on pensions, IAS 19 Accounting for Retirement
Benefits in the Financial Statements of Enterprises
(IASC, 1983) was oriented towards measuring
costs for the income statement, and was flexible
enough to permit companies the choice of whether
or not to use salary projections in measuring the
regular pension expense. As part of the IASC’s
Improvements project (Camfferman and Zeff,
2006: 285), a revised version of IAS 19,
Retirement Benefit Costs (IASC, 1993) made the
use of salary projections the ‘benchmark’ treat-
ment, but continued to follow the orientation to-
wards the income statement of the earlier
document. This was soon to change, as the next re-
vision of IAS 19, Employee Benefits (IASC,
1998a) moved towards a balance sheet approach,
with a requirement to recognise:
(a) a liability when an employee has provided
service in exchange for employee benefits to
be paid in the future; and
(b) an expense when the entity consumes the eco-
nomic benefit arising from service provided
by an employee in exchange for employee
benefits. (IAS 19, Objective)
IAS 19 has subsequently undergone several
amendments, but the broad objective is unchanged.
A similar revolution took place in the UK, with
the Accounting Standards Board replacing SSAP
24 with Financial Reporting Standard 17
Retirement Benefits (ASB, 2000). In practice, the
introduction of FRS 17 was delayed so much that
most listed UK companies moved straight from
SSAP 24 to IAS 19 on first time adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards after
2005. IAS 19 is consistent with FRS 17 in allow-
ing British companies to follow the accounting
practices required by the ASB’s standard, but IAS
19 provides some alternative accounting treat-
ments for actuarial gains and losses, and a few UK
companies have taken advantage of these options.
In the USA, the FASB revised SFAS No. 87 in
SFAS No. 158 Employers’ Accounting for Defined
Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans
(FASB, 2006). This required employers to recog-
nise the funded status of pension plans by compar-
ing the fair value of plan assets with the PBO
rather than the ABO. Rather than removing the
various spreading devices for elements of pension
costs that SFAS No. 87 required, the new standard
retained these but allowed the income statement
and balance sheet to integrate with each other by
requiring companies to include the previously un-
recognised elements of pension gains and losses
elsewhere in comprehensive income, with various
‘recycling’ techniques being needed as these gains
and losses were included in the ‘net periodic ben-
efit cost’.
Given the substantial, though not complete, con-
vergence of accounting standards relating to retire-
ment benefits, the remainder of the paper
concentrates on an analysis of the logic underpin-
ning the current version of IAS 19, set against the
background of the Framework for the Preparation
and Presentation of Financial Statements (IASC,
1989) and other IAS standards.
3.3. Identifying the pension liability
In their discussion of accounting for intangibles,
Napier and Power (1992) suggested that the logi-
cal approach to the question of whether or not to
include intangibles on the balance sheet involved
first the identification of an accounting asset, and
only then a consideration of the amount at which
the asset would be measured. However, they ob-
served that ‘issues of identification, recognition
and measurement are so heavily interrelated in
practice that it is often impossible to distinguish
between them’ (Napier and Power, 1992: 86). This
applies to liabilities as well as assets. It is difficult
to separate the conceptual identification of the em-
ployer’s pension liability from the measurement of
that liability. For example, is the use of projected
salaries purely a measurement issue, or is it funda-
mental to deciding what the pension liability actu-
ally is, in accounting terms? In the present
versions of the main financial reporting standards,
little attention is paid to explaining in conceptual
terms, rather than discussing the calculation of,
such notions as a ‘defined benefit obligation’. The
definition offered by IAS 19 (‘expected future
payments required to settle the obligation resulting
from employee service in the current and prior pe-
riods’ – IAS 19, para. 7) is grounded in the ‘pen-
sion exchange’ that Napier (1983) identified,
focuses on the obligation that the employer takes
on in exchange for the pension promises included
in the employment contract, and identifies the lia-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 237
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bility with the settlement of the obligation. This
definition is clearly influenced by the Framework,
where a ‘liability’ is defined as ‘a present obliga-
tion of the entity arising from past events, the set-
tlement of which is expected to result in an
outflow from the entity of resources embodying
economic benefits’ (Framework, para. 49(b)).
However, most of IAS 19 is taken up with discus-
sion of the measurement of the defined benefit ob-
ligation, implying that its conceptualisation is
relatively straightforward.
However, since the development of the
Framework, the IASC and IASB, alongside other
standard-setters and academics, have been giving
careful thought to the conceptualisation of liabili-
ties. Particular mention may be made of the study
for the ASB by Lennard (2002); the report for the
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
(ACCA) by Nobes (2003); and the review by
Botosan et al. (2005). Lennard in particular com-
pares the various definitions of an accounting lia-
bility offered by standard-setting bodies. A
common feature is that accounting liabilities are
present obligations – an obligation being defined
by the Framework (para. 60) as ‘a duty or respon-
sibility to act or perform in a certain way’. So the
pension liability to be recognised in the employer’s
financial statements at a particular point in time
must be (or must be based on) the ‘duty or respon-
sibility’ that the employer bears at that point in time
in respect of the pension arrangements between the
employer and both current and past employees.
Accounting for pension liabilities must now be
viewed against the background of IAS 37
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent
Assets (IASC, 1998b). Although this standard does
not as such apply to retirement benefits, the defini-
tion of a provision as ‘a liability of uncertain tim-
ing or amount’ (IAS 27, para. 10) has clear
resonances for pensions, where the amounts of
benefits to be paid and the periods over which pay-
ments are due are uncertain. IAS 37 differentiates
between a ‘legal obligation’ and a ‘constructive
obligation’, terms that are also used in IAS 19
(para. 52). The IAS 37 definition of ‘legal obliga-
tion’ covers obligations derived from implicit as
well as explicit terms of a contract, as well as those
flowing from legislation or ‘other operation of
law’. Constructive obligations are derived from an
entity’s actions, usually past practice or stated
policies, giving rise to a legitimate expectation that
the entity will fulfil certain responsibilities. The
borderline between legal and constructive obliga-
tions may be difficult to identify, particularly given
the doctrine of promissory estoppel (Botosan et al.,
2005: 164) that exists in some legal regimes.
However, the implication is that an analysis of the
pension liability will require consideration as to
what the employer’s present obligation is.
The gratuity theory of pensions regarded the ob-
ligation as arising no earlier than the point of time
when the employer granted the pension (typically
upon retirement), and, if the continued payment of
the pension was at the employer’s discretion, a li-
ability would arise only when each individual pen-
sion payment was due. The deferred remuneration
theory of pensions implies that the liability is in-
curred in exchange for employees’ services (estab-
lishing a pension scheme or the commencement of
pensionable employment would not in themselves
constitute an ‘obligating event’ – Napier, 1983:
101–106). What, however, constitutes the ‘settle-
ment’ of the pension obligation? Some possibili-
ties are:
(i) payment of the benefits themselves;
(ii) payment to a third party to assume liability for
the benefits, with no further recourse to the
employer;
(iii) payment to a third party to assume liability for
the benefits, with recourse to the employer if
the third party is unable to pay the benefits;
(iv) payment to a current or past employee to re-
lease the employer, or a third party, from an
obligation to pay the benefits.
The first of these possibilities arises in an un-
funded pension scheme. The second possibility
arises in a traditional defined contribution scheme,
but also represents the strict legal position of some
defined benefit schemes. The fourth possibility is
often rendered impracticable in specific countries
because it leads to the imposition of significant tax
penalties on the employee.
The third possibility, however, is closest to the
present situation in many countries where defined
benefit pension schemes are common (for exam-
ple, the USA and UK). Even where no legal obli-
gation is imposed by statute or case law that
requires employers to stand behind the vehicles
through which defined benefit pensions are se-
cured, it could be argued that there is a construc-
tive obligation on the part of the employer to
ensure that pension promises are met. This is the
philosophy underpinning FRS 17:
‘[T]he employer has a liability if it has a legal or
constructive obligation to make good a deficit in
the defined benefit scheme. In general, the em-
ployer will either have a legal obligation under
the terms of the scheme trust deed or will have
by its past actions and statements created a con-
structive obligation.’ (FRS 17, para. 39)
In the vivid words of Blake et al. (2008b: 18),
this implies that the pension liability, and assets
held to finance the liability, are ‘not ours, Guv’. It
would certainly be open to an employer to argue
that, whatever past practice had been, in the future
238 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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the employer would not stand ready to make good
a deficit beyond any obligation imposed by law.
Would this mean that the employer could avoid
recognising any deficit as a liability beyond its
legal obligation?
However, both IAS 19 and SFAS No. 87/158
imply that the full liability to pay benefits remains
with the employer, unless settled through payment
to a third party without recourse. This suggests that
the long-standing distinction between defined con-
tribution and defined benefit pension plans is
drawn in the wrong place – what matters is not the
basis on which the benefits are determined but
rather the extent to which employees, either direct-
ly or indirectly through pension intermediaries,
have recourse to the employer if the assets held to
finance the benefits are insufficient to fund bene-
fits based on a formula, or inadequate to provide a
level of pension acceptable to the beneficiaries. If
there is no recourse, then the only liability relates
to payments that the employer has contracted to
make to a third party, and the liability is settled
when the payments are made. If the employer is
responsible for the payment of promised benefits,
whether this is a direct responsibility to make pay-
ments out of resources available to the employer
when the benefits fall due (as would arise in an un-
funded scheme), or whether the responsibility is
mediated through a separate investment vehicle
such as a pension fund, but the employer stands
ready to ensure that there are sufficient resources
in the vehicle to pay the promised benefits, then
the employer has a liability for the benefits.
But the fact that the employer assumes this lia-
bility in exchange for the services provided by em-
ployees means that the liability in respect of any
employee will typically (but not necessarily) grow
over time, as the employee provides services, and
be settled over time as benefits are paid. Liability-
based pension standards deal with this by attribut-
ing units of benefits to periods of service. The
liability at any point in time is based upon the
value of the units of benefit attributed to service up
to that point.4 However, in arriving at the ‘benefit’
to be reflected in the determination of the liability,
various decisions must be made. This is because a
liability is by definition a present obligation,
whereas the benefits are typically paid in the fu-
ture. Some of the problems in determining the lia-
bility flow from the uncertainties involved in
looking into the future, but these are likely to be
measurement issues (for example, how long will
retired employees and their dependants live to col-
lect their pensions, how likely is it that employees
will die or leave employment before retirement).
Other problems are more fundamental.
3.4. Final or current salaries?
The first of these problems relates to identifying
that part of the total benefits considered to give
rise to the present obligation at a particular date. In
this process, should the employer take into account
the likely salaries that will be used to determine
the benefits promised (in many schemes, this 
will be salaries at or close to retirement – ‘final
salaries’), or should the benefit estimates be based
on current salary levels? Connected with this,
should changes (typically increases) in benefits as
they are paid be taken into account: (a) at all; (b)
only if mandated under current legislation or con-
tract; or (c) if there is a reasonable expectation that
benefits will be changed? The main current stan-
dards (for example, IAS 19, para. 83) require the
pension obligation to be determined by taking into
account estimated future salary increases, manda-
tory or contractual benefit changes, and benefit
changes for which a constructive obligation exists
(for example, a regular and ongoing practice of in-
creasing benefits in payment in line with infla-
tion).
The answer to these questions depends on how
the expression ‘present obligation’ is interpreted.
The employer is certainly obliged to pay, or ensure
the payment of, pensions and other related bene-
fits. But, at a specific point in time, does the em-
ployer have a present obligation (if not legal, then
at least constructive), to pay pensions calculated in
terms of variables that will not become determined
until after that point in time? The implicit contract,
lifetime labour market view advocated by econo-
mists such as Ippolito (1985) implied that employ-
ee pension expectations at any time were based on
estimates of lifetime pay rather than simply on cur-
rent pay, so the pension liability incurred by the
employer in exchange for employees’ services
should itself be based on estimates of lifetime pay
as these would determine the pension benefits.
This would typically lead to the use of final
salaries (and expected changes in benefits in pay-
ment) in determining the pension liability. The
spot labour market view advocated by Bulow
(1982) and others implied that employees would
take into account only current salaries, since they
would not assume that they would remain in em-
ployment to benefit from future salaries. The stan-
dard-setters’ choice of using future salaries was
perhaps influenced by a sense that the implicit
contract view of labour markets represented eco-
nomic relations between employers and employ-
ees more faithfully than the spot market view, as
well as an awareness that use of future salaries
tended to lead to initially higher pension contribu-
tions under most actuarial funding methods (thus
encouraging employers to fund their schemes
more generously), while smoothing pension costs
more than alternative approaches.
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 239
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However, should future salaries be reflected in
the computation of a present obligation? One per-
son who believed that they should not was Robert
Sprouse, a member of the FASB when SFAS 
No. 87 was issued. Sprouse dissented from the
standard, arguing:
‘[A]n employer cannot have a present obligation
for pension benefits related to salary increases
that are contingent upon future events – future
inflation, future promotions, future improved
productivity ... [T]he decision to grant increases
in wages and salaries, whatever the reason, is an
event that has directly related consequences, in-
cluding increases in employers’ social security
taxes and pension costs, as well as the wages and
salaries themselves. Accounting should recog-
nize all of those directly related consequences at
the time the event occurs ... Anticipating the ef-
fects of those future events on pension cost in
accounting for the current period ... is no more
appropriate than anticipating the future higher
wages and salaries themselves in accounting for
the current period.’ (FASB, 1985: 26–27)
Basically the same arguments have been offered
in the Discussion Paper prepared by PAAinE
(2008: 42). This follows from the Paper’s conclu-
sion that ‘only benefits that the entity is presently
committed (by legal or constructive obligation) to
pay should be reflected in the liability’ (PAAinE,
2008: 38).
Looking at the pension liability as a present ob-
ligation, it appears anomalous to argue that an em-
ployer does not have a present obligation to make
future salary increases, but does have a present ob-
ligation to pay pensions reflecting possible future
salary increases. As an employee works for anoth-
er year, the pension liability in respect of that em-
ployee, in a final salary defined benefit pension
scheme, increases not only because an extra year’s
pensionable service has been accrued, but also be-
cause any salary increase during the current year
applies to the whole pensionable service to date
rather than just to the current year. Perhaps in the
1980s, standard-setters had memories of the prob-
lems generated by ‘backlog depreciation’ in cur-
rent cost accounting, and wished to avoid
analogous problems for pensions. However, a lia-
bility approach to accounting for pensions focuses
on the present obligation rather than on possible
impacts on the pattern of cost recognition.
Ironically, the one possibility that accounting stan-
dards such as SSAP 24 appeared to rule out – the
use of current rather than final salaries in deter-
mining the pension obligation – may have a
sounder logical basis.
3.5. Vesting
Pension schemes sometimes impose qualifying
periods on employees before they become entitled
to receive benefits, referred to as vesting. An em-
ployee who leaves before vesting has no entitle-
ment to benefits. Does this mean that the employer
has no present obligation in respect of employees
whose benefits are not yet vested? Employees who
leave employment may have no legal claim to ben-
efits after leaving, but employees who continue
will be accruing rights. Even though these rights
are subject to the satisfaction of a condition before
they can be enforced by the employees, employees
have a reasonable expectation that they will be
able to satisfy the condition, and in some situations
the employer may face the risk of penalties for dis-
missing employees just before their benefits vest.
Where the employer does not have a legal obliga-
tion, a form of constructive obligation is likely to
arise in respect of benefits relating to service be-
fore a vesting date, because the employer cannot
normally renege on the pension promise in respect
of employees prior to vesting (or more realistical-
ly, the employer cannot differentially renege in re-
spect of this group of employees as opposed to the
employees in general). It is certainly reasonable
for the employer to reflect the probability that
some benefits will, in fact, not vest in determining
the amount of the pension liability, but this is a
measurement issue rather than one relating to the
identification of the liability.
If there is a constructive obligation in the case of
benefits that are unvested at the measurement date,
why should there not be a constructive obligation
at the measurement date in respect of future salary
increases? Indeed, the argument could be made
(PAAinE, 2008: 43) that, at the measurement date,
the benefits based on current salary levels (adjust-
ed by any legal or contractual increases such as
mandatory indexation) are in effect vested, while
the additional benefits that are expected to flow
based on future salary levels are, in effect, unvest-
ed. However, a closer examination of the factors
influencing future salary increases may help to
clarify matters.5 For an individual employee,
salary increases depend on four factors. First, there
are general pay rises as a result of inflation.
Second, in some organisations an individual may
benefit from moving up a standard pay scale
through pay increments accruing annually or at
some other regular interval. Third, individuals may
benefit from promotion to better-paid positions.
Finally, employees may share in the general suc-
cess of their organisation through increased pay (to
some extent, the availability of promotions may it-
self be dependent on the organisation’s success). A
final salary pension plan gives employees an indi-
rect stake in the future of the organisation.
However, higher salaries resulting from promo-
240 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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tions and sharing in the future success of the em-
ployer are the consequence of events after the
measurement date, and they affect the pension lia-
bility when they occur in the future. They are not
part of the present obligation. On the other hand,
salary increases that may be expected to occur in-
dependently of the employer’s future economic
prospects are part of the present obligation.
Overall, then, in identifying the pension liability,
what matters is the present obligation at the meas-
urement date. This present obligation is based on
the benefits relating to employee services up to the
measurement date, and is settled in one of two
ways: either through payments to a third party who
has no further recourse to the employer6 or through
payment of the benefits directly by the employer
or through a third party who has recourse to the
employer. The liability is based on the contractual
benefit formula, taking into account any addition-
al requirements imposed by law affecting the inci-
dence of benefits (such as limited indexation of
benefits in payment or the amount of pensionable
salary used in the benefit formula). This should be
calculated using data available at the measurement
date, including current salaries adjusted for un-
avoidable future salary increases, rather than esti-
mated final salaries, but including a liability in
respect of service before any vesting condition is
satisfied, on the basis that the pension liability re-
flects all legal and constructive obligations in re-
spect of service up to the measurement date. This
approach would apply whether the benefits are
based on length of service and salary, as in tradi-
tional defined benefit plans, or on the accumulated
balance in a notional account, as in the more recent
‘cash balance’ plans that have been emerging in
the USA and elsewhere (Johnson and Uccello,
2003; IASB, 2008; Thomas and Williams, 2009).
4. Measuring the pension liability
4.1. Basis of measurement
Pension obligations are notorious for the high
degree of uncertainty that they involve. Forecasts
must be made of the periods over which benefits
will be paid, and one of the major issues in recent
years is the extent to which previous forecasts of
longevity (how long on average pensioners will
live after retirement) have turned out to undershoot
actual experience – people are living longer on av-
erage. A wide range of other demographic assump-
tions underpin estimates of pension liabilities,
some relating to the population as a whole, and
others to a specific employer. These would include
assumptions about the proportion of employees
who would satisfy any vesting conditions, and pat-
terns of labour turnover in general. In addition, as-
sumptions are required about financial matters
such as possible future rates of inflation (if some
element of pension indexation is a legal or contrac-
tual obligation). Under existing accounting stan-
dards, it is also necessary to estimate future
salaries if the benefit formula takes these into ac-
count. The various assumptions should be ‘unbi-
ased and mutually compatible’ (IAS 19, para. 72),
and should be ‘best estimates’ (IAS 19, para. 73).
The use of ‘best estimates’ is required in the
measurement of provisions under IAS 37: ‘The
amount recognised as a provision shall be the best
estimate of the expenditure required to settle the
present obligation at the balance sheet date’
(para. 36). It is explained that ‘the best estimate of
the expenditure required to settle the present obli-
gation is the amount that an entity would rational-
ly pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet
date or to transfer it to a third party at that time’
(para. 37). Two elements of this are particularly
significant: first, the focus on the balance sheet
date, and second the notion of a rational payment.
Settlement in this context would involve the em-
ployer in making payments, or otherwise transfer-
ring economic resources, to current and former
employees, or their dependants, in exchange for
the surrender of their rights to receive future bene-
fits. In many countries, such a direct settlement
may not be possible owing to legislative or regula-
tory restrictions. In the absence of such restric-
tions, would the rational settlement amount be
limited to the employer’s strict legal obligation
(excluding, for example, unvested benefits)?
Would a rational member of a pension scheme be
prepared to settle for less than the present value of
benefits based on service to date but reflecting ex-
pectations of final salaries, or would the option
that the employer usually has to ‘freeze’ the bene-
fit expectations by closing the scheme to further
accrual of benefits mean that the rational employ-
ee cannot expect more than benefits based on ap-
plying the benefit formula to current data? Or
would the existence of a series of complex and in-
terlocking options on the part of both employer
and employees (Sharpe, 1976) mean that the ‘ra-
tional settlement amount’ would be somewhere be-
tween these extremes?
What about transferring the liability to a third
party? One of the most interesting phenomena in
the pensions market in recent years has been the
emergence of a range of organisations prepared to
take over, for a consideration, some or all of the
pension obligations of particular employers. For
example, the UK company Cable and Wireless an-
nounced in September 2008 that it had transferred
around £1bn of liabilities relating to retired em-
ployees to a third party (Cohen, 2008). These
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 241
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remaining after all benefits have been discharged by the third
party – would such a claim represent an accounting asset?
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:59
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
‘buy-outs’ are less difficult to value rationally
where the pension plan is closed to further accru-
als of pensionable service, so the potential pur-
chaser does not bear any risk in respect of future
salary changes (and in particular avoids the ‘moral
hazard’ risk that an employer no longer liable for
pension benefits would increase future salaries
disproportionately to raise pensions for continuing
employees). In some cases, the pension liability in
respect of an individual current or former employ-
ee or pensioner can be estimated reliably by refer-
ence to the current price of equivalent annuities,
and pension actuaries are regularly required to
compute acceptable ‘transfer payments’ in respect
of employees moving from one employer to anoth-
er and seeking to transfer their accumulated pen-
sions to the new employer’s scheme (Napier,
2007: 346). However, at present the buy-out mar-
ket may not be sufficiently deep to provide reliable
measures of the pension liability. There are also
various factors (such as the loss of any recourse to
the general assets and cash flows of the employer
to fund pension obligations on an ongoing basis)
that may bias a buy-out valuation upwards
(PAAinE, 2008: 116–117).
Given the restrictions and reservations relating
to direct settlement at the balance sheet date and
transfer to a third party, what possibilities remain
for measuring the pension liability? Increasingly,
pensions are provided within a regulatory regime
in which a minimum prudential level of funding is
indicated in respect of benefits. Although the rela-
tionship between such a regulatory funding re-
quirement and the actual assets available to use for
settling pension liabilities is relevant for assessing
the future cash flows of the employer (because a
shortfall in the regulatory measure will result in a
requirement to assign resources to provide securi-
ty for pension liabilities rather than for alternative
uses in the enterprise, such as paying dividends), it
would not normally be a measure of an accounting
liability.7 One situation where it could be relevant
is where the employer has an effective ‘put option’
allowing it to transfer its pension obligations to a
third party such as a government-sponsored insur-
ance or guarantee fund and to settle the claim of
such a fund by transferring assets. In rare situa-
tions, employers may calculate that reneging on
their pension commitments in this way may en-
hance shareholder value in the long term, notwith-
standing any loss of employee goodwill in the
short term.
Until the buy-out market has developed suffi-
ciently to provide reliable measures of a ‘transac-
tions-based’ current settlement value, then ‘we are
thrown back on to the sort of actuarially based
present value calculation required by the financial
reporting standards’ (Napier, 2007: 346).
Effectively, the liability is being settled through
payments of benefits, and the measure of the lia-
bility is arrived at by making the best estimate of
the amounts to be paid in the future in respect of
the obligation to pay benefits recognised at the bal-
ance sheet date and discounting these amounts to
determine their aggregate present value at that
date. This has been described as a ‘run-off’ meas-
ure, ‘where the employer continues to administer
the liabilities and pays benefits when they fall due,
either from its internal resources or from assets
that have previously been set aside’ (PAAinE,
2008: 116). It is important to remember that this
‘run-off’ assumes that no further benefit entitle-
ments will accrue, and no further assets will be set
aside. Some actuarial funding methods take into
account patterns of future expected contributions
as well as earnings on pension assets in assessing
the financial position of a pension scheme, possi-
bly by projecting a ‘rolling cash balance’ (Exley et
al., 1997: 851). However, if one lesson has been
learned over the past 25 years, it is that financing
pension promises and measuring accounting liabil-
ities are separate processes.
4.2. Discount rate
As the run-off measure is the value at the meas-
urement date of benefits accumulated through
service up to that date (to the extent that they have
not already been paid to beneficiaries or otherwise
settled), and these benefits will be paid over future
periods, the liability must be measured by taking
into account: (a) the time value of money; and (b)
the risks involved because of the demographic and
other uncertainties involved in estimating the ben-
efits to be paid. If the present obligation in respect
of pensions is based on final salaries, then uncer-
tainties in respect of future salaries will need to be
reflected. However, if the present obligation is
based only on current salaries at the measurement
date, then this uncertainty does not apply (though
uncertainties relating to any mandatory indexation
of current salaries would need to be reflected, as
indexation would be a legal obligation). The ap-
propriate discount rate to use has been a major
issue of controversy in pension accounting over
the past 25 years. Cost-based standards such as
SSAP 24 effectively used the overall rate of return
on pension scheme assets as the discount rate, but
this would only be appropriate in an economic
sense if the pension scheme assets represented a
perfect ‘hedge’ against the pension obligations. In
practice, it has been difficult to find convincing ev-
idence that the rate of return on pension scheme
assets (which is itself dependent on the investment
242 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
7 In some countries, a strong minimum funding requirement
may restrict the amounts that an employer can recover from a
pension fund, and this affects the recognition and measure-
ment of pension assets and liabilities (IASB, 2007).
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allocation policies of different schemes) is strong-
ly enough associated with uncertainties such as
growth in pay (Khorasanee, 2004). Modern pen-
sion standards require the use of the rate of return
on high quality corporate bonds as the liability dis-
count rate, on the basis that this reflects both the
time value of money and measurement uncertain-
ties.
The PAAinE (2008) and IASB (2008) Discussion
Papers disagree on the appropriate basis for meas-
uring pension liabilties. PAAinE’s view is that, in
some cases, a current settlement or transfer valua-
tion (such as a buy-out value) may be more rele-
vant, but in the majority of cases where a run-off
valuation is needed, the liability would be deter-
mined by discounting the entity’s best estimates of
future cash flows at a ‘current market discount rate
to reflect the time value of money only, i.e. a risk-
free rate’ (PAAinE, 2008: 124). PAAinE acknowl-
edges that the liability should reflect some margin
for risk, but claims that some risks (such as
longevity) cannot be quantified. On the other hand,
the IASB (2008: 76) suggests that, at least for what
it calls ‘contribution-based promises’, measure-
ment should incorporate ‘the effect of risk’. Just
because there may be difficulties in quantifying
some elements causing uncertainty as to the future
benefits to be paid, this does not justify ignoring
those elements that can be quantified. The emer-
gence of contribution-based promises that provide
a wide spectrum of possible benefits makes the use
of a single discount rate less sound. For example,
a pension promise of a fund on retirement deter-
mined by accumulating contributions calculated as
a percentage of current salaries plus a return based
on an equity index would be significantly more
risky than one offering a fixed lump sum. It is pos-
sible that the difference between PAAinE and the
IASB here is a matter of focus, as PAAinE concen-
trates on traditional salary-based pension promises
while the IASB looks at contribution-based prom-
ises. In the case of salary-based promises, if the
pension liability is based on current rather than
projected salaries, the main remaining risks are de-
mographic, and it would make more sense to dis-
count risk-adjusted best estimates8 of future
benefits using a risk-free rate. The use of a corpo-
rate bond rate for discounting pension liabilities
captures only some of the uncertainties involved.
The bond rate could be considered as the aggregate
of: (i) the real risk-free rate (the pure time value of
money); (ii) expected inflation; and (iii) the aver-
age expected rate of default. Although the first two
components are relevant, there is no obvious link
between the probability of default on corporate
bonds and the measurement uncertainties relating
to pension liabilities.
Small changes in assumption may have a signif-
icant impact on the measurement of pension liabil-
ities. Given that the liability is reported as a single
‘spot estimate’, employers can give some insight
into the effect of changes in assumptions, includ-
ing changes in the discount rate for liabilities, by
providing a sensitivity analysis of the effect of a
unit change in specific assumptions on the amount
of the liability. Such an analysis has been suggest-
ed by the ASB in its recent Reporting Statement
Retirement Benefits – Disclosures (ASB, 2007:
para. 12). An interesting suggestion has been made
by Blake et al. (2008a) that the use of charts show-
ing the effects of variations in key assumptions
may be helpful in indicating the impact of factors
such as longevity on pension liabilities.
5. Pension assets
It is not necessary for pension promises to be fi-
nanced in advance by the setting aside of specific
assets, whether this comes about through the em-
ployer merely designating particular assets over
which it retains ownership (and the discretion to
apply the assets for other purposes than paying
pension benefits), or whether the employer trans-
fers resources to a third party, such as a trust.
Employers could simply settle pensions as they
fall due out of current resources. Advance financ-
ing (‘funding’) complicates pension accounting in
several ways. First, transferring resources to a sep-
arate vehicle raises the question of whether the
employer’s pension liability is thereby settled.
Settlement could be complete (if the vehicle has no
subsequent recourse to the employer if assets are
insufficient to pay the promised benefits), or par-
tial. In the latter situation, the liability is settled, in
part, by transferring resources and, in part, by the
employer’s assumption of a new liability, to stand
ready to meet claims from the vehicle for addition-
al resources (and in some cases the assumption of
the right to receive economic resources from the
vehicle if these are not needed to pay benefits). As
already noted, FRS 17 is based on this analysis.
More generally, the question arises as to whether
the employer should show a gross liability, with
any pension assets disclosed separately, or a net li-
ability, deducting any pension assets from the pen-
sion liability. Offsetting an asset and a liability is
usually only appropriate if there is a formal right
of set-off and an intention to settle on a net basis or
to realise the asset and settle the liability simulta-
neously. If the employer retains the primary legal
obligation to pay benefits as they fall due, but sets
aside, either notionally or through a separate vehi-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 243
8 Unless it is possible for the employer to construct a perfect
hedge against pension liabilities (in which case the liability
can be measured as equal to the current market value of the
perfect hedge), a simple probability-weighted expected value
of the pension liability will understate the risk-adjusted best
estimate of the liability. My thanks to Geoff Whittington for
making this observation.
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cle, assets to be used for paying the benefits, then
it would not be appropriate to offset the pension
assets and liabilities. Where a vehicle such as a
pension trust holds pension assets and has the pri-
mary legal obligation to pay benefits, does this
allow for offset?
One factor is the extent to which the employer
can exercise control over the assets and obligations
of the pension vehicle. This should be a matter of
fact, determined by the legal documents that estab-
lish the pension scheme and by the current regula-
tory regime within which the employer makes
pension promises. If the vehicle has no recourse to
the employer for shortfalls in its assets, then the
employer’s liability is restricted to contracted-for
contributions to the vehicle. How the vehicle in-
vests these contributions is irrelevant to the em-
ployer. Even when the vehicle has recourse, the
employer may have no, or only limited, control
over the vehicle’s investment policies. In this case,
the employer has a net liability (or perhaps a net
asset), measured as the difference between the
measurement of the gross pension liability and the
measurement of any pension assets held by the ve-
hicle. However, if the employer has effective con-
trol over the vehicle’s investment policies, then the
netting of pension assets and liabilities would not
be appropriate, since this would not reflect ade-
quately the employer’s rights, obligations and
risks. Indeed, in this situation, the pension vehicle
may be, in substance, a subsidiary of the employ-
er.
The actual measurement of pension assets has
become less of an issue with the adoption of a lia-
bility over a cost approach. With cost approaches
being based on actuarial funding methods, the sep-
arate measurement of pension assets was often not
required, because actuaries would estimate future
cash flows from pension assets rather than evalu-
ate the assets themselves. Whether the term ‘fair
value’ or ‘market value’ is used, current pension
standards require the use of a market-based meas-
ure for pension assets. This may lead to volatility
as market prices change rapidly, but it provides re-
liable information about the current assessment of
the value of pension assets by market participants
in general. It also avoids the use of earnings man-
agement techniques through smoothing and aver-
aging market prices. However, it may mean that
identical assets are valued differently if designated
as pension assets or considered to be generic finan-
cial assets. For example, financial assets classified
as ‘held-to-maturity’ would be measured at amor-
tised cost. Identical assets held to finance pension
liabilities would be measured at fair/market value,
even if it was the intention of the employer, or a
pension vehicle, to hold them to maturity.
The analysis of measurement and offsetting
takes pension assets and pension liabilities as a
whole. However, are all pension liabilities basical-
ly the same? Some liabilities may be less risky
(more certain) than others, and it may be possible
to construct effective hedges in respect of such li-
abilities. For example, it may be possible for a
pension fund to purchase an annuity whose cash
flows precisely offset the benefits payable to a par-
ticular member. Indeed, in some pension arrange-
ments, the benefits will be settled by the purchase
of an appropriate annuity. Does this argument ex-
tend to a situation where a particular class of lia-
bility, for example, the liability relating to
pensions currently being paid, can be settled on a
run-off basis from the earnings and proceeds of
designated assets? If so, then it would be possible
to net off some pension assets against the associat-
ed liabilities,9 leaving the remaining assets (which
could well be predominantly equities rather than
fixed interest securities) to be shown gross on the
employer’s balance sheet, and the remaining lia-
bilities (which could well relate only to obligations
to current employees) also shown gross? At pres-
ent, it is unlikely that such netting-off would be
reasonable, especially as it is currently difficult to
hedge against longevity risk (Blake et al., 2006).
However, more pension schemes may follow
Cable and Wireless in effectively selling off their
pensions in payment, thus taking the liabilities,
and assets previously held in the pension fund to
finance these liabilities, off the balance sheet per-
manently.
6. The income statement and disclosure
6.1. Reporting the pension expense
At present, the various pension standards incor-
porate the outcomes of past compromises in three
main respects:
(i) the use of the so-called ‘corridor’ approach
permits some gains and losses to be ignored
altogether;
(ii) various smoothing and spreading devices pro-
vide management with some discretion relat-
ing to the timing of recognition of certain
gains and losses; and
(iii) the income statement is credited with the ex-
pected return on pension assets rather than
credited with the actual return on plan assets
(or debited if the actual return in a period is
negative).
Particular issues arise in relation to actuarial
gains and losses, which come about because the
actual experience during a period turns out to be
different from expectations and estimates made at
the start of the period, and because the estimates
244 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
9 My thanks to Christian Stadler for making this suggestion.
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used in calculating pension liabilities at the end of
the period differ from those used for the previous
period. Normally, differences between estimates
and actual outcomes, and the effects of revising es-
timates, are treated as part of the expense of a pe-
riod, but pension standards such as IAS 19 allow
(although with some reluctance) various options
for dealing with these revisions. One option in-
volved the creation of a new accounting statement,
the ‘statement of recognised income and expense’
(SORIE). The ‘corridor’ is a residue of the cost-
based approach to pension accounting grounded in
actuarial funding methods. As Napier observed:
‘When an actuarial valuation gives rise to a
small [actuarial] gain or loss, many actuaries ad-
vise that their recommended contribution rates
should not be altered. The employer is advised
not to take credit in any way for an [actuarial]
gain which may fall within the expected range of
variation in relation to the pension scheme; on
the other hand, he need not concern himself
overmuch with a small [actuarial] loss which the
actuary also regards as falling within the expect-
ed range of statistical variation, and which it is
considered will be made up in a short time out of
normal contributions.’ (Napier, 1983: 131)
So if the actuarial gain or loss was expected to
have no impact on contributions, there was no
need to recognise it. However, in a liability-based
approach, this argument makes no sense, because
an actuarial gain or loss is an indication of expect-
ed changes in future cash flows, or changes in how
they are valued. The ‘corridor’ is essentially a
funding device that has no place in accounting.
Even without the ‘corridor’, IAS 19 permits ac-
tuarial gains and losses for each defined benefit
plan to be recognised over the ‘expected average
remaining working lives of the employees partici-
pating in that plan’, or over a shorter period, which
could conceivably include immediate recognition
(IAS 19: para. 93). The fact that flexibility is al-
lowed suggests that there is no clear conceptual
basis for spreading actuarial gains and losses. If
actuarial gains and losses occur, then there may be
a short-term change in the contribution rate, but
again this is an issue of funding rather than ac-
counting. Some writers (for example, Napier,
1983: 144) explored the possibility that actuarial
gains and losses were like past service credits, ar-
gued to be granted by the employer in the expecta-
tion of enhanced future services from employees
in post at a particular date, and earned over these
employees’ remaining working lives with the 
employer (this lingers in IAS 19’s treatment of
past service costs that do not immediately vest –
para. 96). However, the past service credits are
usually irrevocable and thus constitute liabilities,
while the enhanced future services are hypotheti-
cal as economic benefits and thus are unlikely to
constitute accounting assets. If pension assets and
liabilities have changed because of changes in es-
timates or the resolution of previous estimates,
then spreading the impact of such changes simply
defers the recognition of events that have already
happened, and cannot be justified in an asset/lia-
bility-based reporting system.
The main components of actuarial gains and
losses as presently defined are: (a) the difference
between the expected and the actual return on plan
assets; (b) the effect of changes in the discount rate
used for measuring pension liabilities; (c) the 
effect of changes in other actuarial assumptions,
including demographic assumptions such as
longevity; (d) the impact of variations in regula-
tions; and (e) variations in actual experience dur-
ing the period in comparison with previous
estimates. The first one of these is an artificial dif-
ference arising from the use of the expected return
on plan assets in the income statement, one of the
occasions when accountants invent an artificial
number to supplant a real number. There are argu-
ments in favour of using an expected return.
Actual returns are highly volatile and this may re-
duce the predictive value of income numbers
(most numbers in the income statement are subject
to some degree of volatility, but this does not pro-
vide an excuse for general smoothing). The per-
formance of pension assets is outside the control of
managers of the employer. Pensions are long-term
arrangements, and recognising short-term fluctua-
tions in income may lead managers to enter into
costly hedging transactions to reduce the volatility
or allocate the pension assets to less volatile in-
vestments (this could be prudent from a funding
viewpoint). However, if pension assets are recog-
nised either directly or indirectly (by being netted
off against pension liabilities) as assets of the em-
ployer, then returns on pension assets should be
treated in the same way as returns on financial as-
sets, that is, the actual return should be included as
a part of financing income. This would remove one
of the major elements of actuarial gains and losses.
Another significant element of actuarial gains
and losses arises from changes in the interest rate
used to discount pension liabilities. If this is a cur-
rent market interest rate, it is likely that there will
be some correlation between changes in pension
assets and changes in the discount rate – if the pen-
sion liability is perfectly hedged, then the change
in the liability arising from recalculation using the
current discount rate will be equal to the change in
the market value of pension assets. In addition to
interest on the pension liability, reflecting the fact
that benefit payments are one year closer at the end
of the period (and thus have a higher present
value), it would be reasonable to include the effect
of changes in the discount rate as part of financing
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 245
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expense. Volatility in interest rates would tend to
offset volatility in returns on pension assets.
The remaining actuarial gains and losses come
from various sources, but are all in different ways
the results of changes in estimates. In some peri-
ods, the incidence of such changes may be highly
significant, and the magnitude of the changes may
be out of proportion to amounts recognised as op-
erating expense (the current service cost and any
past service cost that arises, for example, through
variations in benefit formulae). However, this is a
disclosure issue rather than a measurement or pres-
entation issue. Ideally, changes in assumptions and
differences between estimates and outcomes that
relate to the measurement of benefits included in
the pension obligation would be reflected as a
component of current service cost, since current
service cost is derived from the increase in the
pension obligation during the period. Changes and
differences relating to financing should be includ-
ed with the financing income and expense compo-
nents. Given the interlocking nature of pension
assumptions, it may in practice be difficult to make
such a separation, so it may be more informative to
treat these remaining actuarial gains and losses to-
gether as a separate item in the income statement.
Overall, these proposals would mean that all
gains and losses arising from pensions were recog-
nised in an appropriate part of a statement of com-
prehensive income, rather than being ignored,
smoothed or segregated.
6.2. Disclosure
Is there too much pension disclosure? The note
on retirement benefits in the financial statements
of many large companies may spread over several
pages. This is vastly more substantial than disclo-
sures 25 years ago, which rarely exceeded a few
paragraphs (Napier, 1984). However, it is much
more likely that pension disclosure in the UK in
the 1980s was grossly inadequate, despite the sig-
nificant improvements introduced in SSAP 24, and
foreshadowed by the ASC’s Exposure Draft 32
Disclosure of Pension Information in Company
Accounts (ASC, 1983) and the ASC’s earlier
Interim Report (Napier, 1982). This may have
worked against the interests of various stakehold-
ers. Shareholders may have suffered through not
appreciating early enough the risks involved in
final salary pension schemes, and how the burden
of such schemes was increasing through exten-
sions in longevity. The confused accounting for
contribution holidays may also have provided mis-
leading signals to investors of long-term trends in
profitability. At the same time, lenders may have
gained an over-optimistic impression of compa-
nies’ borrowing capacity, while the government
may have thought that pension schemes were cash
cows to be milked.
In its recent Reporting Statement, the ASB has
set out its general objective for recommending
pension disclosures for defined benefit schemes:
(a) the financial statements contain adequate dis-
closure of the cost of providing retirement
benefits and the related gains, losses, assets
and liabilities;
(b) the users of financial statements can obtain a
clear view of the risks and rewards arising
from defined benefit schemes; and
(c) the funding obligations of the entity in rela-
tion to liabilities of a defined benefit scheme
are clearly identified (ASB, 2007: para. 1).
In addition to the long list (extending over three
pages) of disclosures required by IAS 19, the ASB
recommends additional disclosures, often of infor-
mation whose relevance has emerged recently.
This includes information about the relationship
between the employer and pension scheme
trustees, which helps users to assess the extent to
which the employer controls the scheme’s assets
and liabilities and the extent to which the trustees
can impose obligations on the employer. Greater
clarity on how the pension liability is determined,
including specific disclosure of longevity assump-
tions, and a sensitivity analysis, helps users to ap-
preciate likely variability in the liability in future
periods. Information about buy-out valuations of
the liability and the impact of regulation on the de-
termination of the funding position provides guid-
ance on future cash flows, while giving a clearer
understanding of the options open to management
to transfer some or all of the pension liabilities to
a third party. Finally, rather than just a classifica-
tion of the pension assets into different asset class-
es, some appreciation of the risks associated with
pension assets helps users to assess the likely im-
pact on a given scheme of external changes in
asset markets and prices.
All of this is consistent with the philosophy set
out some years ago by the ICAEW’s Steering
Group on the Financial Reporting of Risk in its re-
port No Surprises: The Case for Better Risk
Reporting (ICAEW, 1999). One paragraph in par-
ticular of this report is worth quoting:
‘When we talk about “no surprises”, we do not
mean that companies should smooth their earn-
ings trend by turning the tap of accounting pru-
dence on and off or that they should eliminate
volatility at all costs. In reality “no surprises”
will involve telling it as it is. If results are really
volatile they should be reported as such and it
should not come as a surprise to the market.’
(ICAEW, 1999: 36).
The provision of information on asset and liabil-
ity risks and the sensitivity of assumptions makes
246 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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it easier for analysts to predict how external factors
(such as significant changes in asset prices) are
likely to affect pension assets and liabilities.
Substantial changes from period to period are 
less disturbing if they can be understood and even
forecast.
7. Conclusion
Many of the arguments and issues concerning ac-
counting for retirement benefits that are currently
being debated by standard-setters and preparers
and users of financial statements have been the
subject of debate for decades. Standard-setters
have been aware of the logic of pension account-
ing during this period, and the logic itself has not
stood still, as new understandings of the principles
of financial reporting have emerged and been ap-
plied in other analogous situations. Accounting for
pensions has moved from being based on cost al-
location and actuarial funding methods towards
being based on the determination and measure-
ment of accounting liabilities. There are still some
issues where it is by no means obvious what the
‘logical’ accounting solution is. The most difficult
remaining issue is whether the pension obligations
forming the basis of an accounting liability as at a
particular date should reflect only factors as at that
date and any mandatory subsequent changes to
these factors, or whether other expected changes,
in particular forecast changes in pay for final
salary pension schemes, should be taken into ac-
count. If there is a present accounting obligation in
respect of all future salary increases, then it is dif-
ferent in nature from the obligation based on cur-
rent salary levels, and perhaps needs to be reported
in a different place on the balance sheet if it is
recognised at all. The other difficult issue is what
discount rate to use in measuring the liability.
Should the existence of risks and uncertainties in
the pension liability factors be reflected in the use
of a discount rate incorporating a risk margin?
Does the use of a corporate bond discount rate ac-
tually provide an appropriate adjustment for risk?
Should any risk margin be the same for all parts of
the pension liability? Finally, can we come up with
a principle for determining the pension liability
that works as well for salary-based promises as for
contribution-based promises?
Many of the compromises made by standard-set-
ters permitted employers to ignore, spread or seg-
regate pension costs that were abnormally large or
particularly volatile. If enough information is pro-
vided as to how pension costs are determined, it
should be possible for users to make up their own
minds about the impact of different aspects of the
overall changes in pension assets and liabilities
that feed into the income statement. One of the
most useful changes will be the replacement of the
artificial ‘expected return on plan assets’ by the ac-
tual return on plan assets, at the same time ‘telling
it as it is’ and removing an accounting-based actu-
arial gain or loss.
Pension assets and liabilities have traditionally
been netted off. In some cases, the substance of the
contractual arrangements establishing a pension
scheme mean that the employer genuinely has only
a net obligation to underwrite shortfalls in the pen-
sion fund, but where the employer effectively con-
trols the pension assets, the case for a net balance
sheet figure is weakened, and indeed the pension
scheme vehicle may qualify as a subsidiary of the
employer. This means that gross assets and liabili-
ties may be reported, leading to the ‘augmented’ or
‘economic’ balance sheet proposed by Bagehot
(1972). However, it may be possible in the future
for some pension liabilities and assets to be netted
off in respect of the more easily hedged elements
such as pensions in payment (though this may re-
quire the development of longevity as well as in-
terest rate and inflation hedges).
Several normative principles emerge from this
study of pension accounting. First, pension ac-
counting should aim at generality. Different ac-
counting treatments should be a consequence of
substantive differences in rights and obligations,
rather than formal differences in pension agree-
ments. Ideally, the same recognition and measure-
ment principles should apply to salary-based and
contribution-based pensions, although application
would need to reflect differences in detail between
these approaches. Second, opportunities for ‘ac-
counting arbitrage’ through being able to designate
certain assets and liabilities as pension assets and
liabilities should be minimised. This could be
achieved by curtailing any discretion that employ-
ers may have to decide whether, for example, par-
ticular investments are held-to-maturity financial
assets or pension assets, but is better achieved
through ensuring consistency in accounting treat-
ment. Third, ‘tell it as it is’ – artificial spreading
and smoothing, or, worse, ignoring aspects of pen-
sion liabilities and costs, should be avoided.
Finally, disclosure should ensure ‘no surprises’.
Pension accounting has come a long way in the
last 30 years. Ironically, however, we may be
ready to achieve a logical system of accounting for
defined benefit pensions only in the context of
their decline.
References
APB (1966). Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 8,
Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans. New York, NY:
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Archibald, T. R. (1980). Accounting for Pension Costs and
Liabilities (A Reconciliation of Accounting and Funding
Practices). Toronto: Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants.
ASB (2000). Financial Reporting Standard 17, Retirement
Benefits. London: Accounting Standards Board.
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 247
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:59
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
ASB (2007). Reporting Statement, Retirement Benefits –
Disclosures. London: Accounting Standards Board.
ASC (1983). Exposure Draft 32, Disclosure of Pension
Information in Company Accounts. London: Accounting
Standards Committee.
ASC (1988). Statement of Standard Accounting Practice
24, Accounting for Pension Costs. London: Accounting
Standards Committee.
Bagehot, W. (1972). ‘Risk and reward in corporate pension
funds’, Financial Analysts Journal, 28: 80–84.
Barth, M. E. (1991). ‘Relative measurement errors among
alternative pension asset and liability measures’.
Accounting Review, 66: 433–463.
Barth, M. E., Beaver, W.H. and Landsman, W.R. (2001).
‘The relevance of the value relevance literature for finan-
cial accounting standard setting: another view’. Journal of
Accounting & Economics, 31: 77–104.
Blake, D., Cairns, A.J.G., Dowd, K. and MacMinn, R.
(2006). ‘Longevity bonds: financial engineering, valuation,
and hedging’. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 73: 647–672.
Blake, D., Dowd, K., and Cairns, A.J.G. (2008a).
‘Longevity risk and the Grim Reaper’s toxic tail: the sur-
vivor fan charts’. Insurance: Mathematics and
Economics, 42: 1062–1066.
Blake, D., Khorasanee, Z., Pickles, J. and Tyrrall, D.
(2008b). An Unreal Number: How Company Pension
Accounting Fosters an Illusion of Certainty. London: The
Pension Institute, Cass Business School.
Botosan, C. A., Koonce, L., Ryan, S.G., Stone, M.S. and
Wahlen, J.M. (2005). ‘Accounting for liabilities: concep-
tual issues, standard setting, and evidence from academic
research’, Accounting Horizons, 19: 159–186.
Bulow, J.I. (1982). ‘What are corporate pension liabili-
ties?’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97: 435–452.
Camfferman, K. and Zeff, S.A. (2006). Financial
Reporting and Global Capital Markets: A History of the
International Accounting Standards Committee,
1973–2000. Oxford: OUP.
CAP (1956). Accounting Research Bulletin No. 47,
Accounting for Costs of Pension Plans. New York, NY:
Committee on Accounting Procedure of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
Chandar, N. and Miranti, P. J. (2007). ‘The development of
actuarial-based pension accounting at the Bell System,
1913–40’. Accounting History, 12: 205–234.
Cohen, N. (2008). ‘C&W leads the way in a new growth
business’. Financial Times (4 September 2008).
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/58e08506-7a19-11dd-bb93-
000077b07658.html (accessed 29 October 2008).
Daley, L.A. (1984). ‘The valuation of reported pension
measures for firms sponsoring defined benefit plans’.
Accounting Review, 59: 177–198.
Dewhirst, J.F. (1971). ‘A conceptual approach to pension
accounting’. The Accounting Review, 46: 365–373.
Exley, C.J., Mehta, S.J.B. and Smith, A.D. (1997). ‘The fi-
nancial theory of defined benefit pension schemes’.
British Actuarial Journal, 3: 835–966.
FASB (1981). Discussion Memorandum, Employers’
Accounting for Pensions and Other Postemployment
Benefits. Stamford, CT: Financial Accounting Standards
Board.
FASB (1985). Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions.
Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Standards Board.
FASB (2006). Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined
Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans.
Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Hannah, L. (1986). Inventing Retirement: The
Development of Occupational Pensions in Britain.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hatfield, H.R. (1916). Modern Accounting. New York, NY:
Appleton.
Hines, R. D. (1988). ‘Financial accounting: in communi-
cating reality, we construct reality’. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 13: 251–261.
Holthausen, R.W. and Watts, R.L. (2001). ‘The relevance
of the value relevance literature for financial accounting
standard setting’. Journal of Accounting & Economics,
31: 3–75.
IASB (2007). IFRIC 14 IAS 19 – The Limit on a Defined
Benefit Asset, Minimum Funding Requirements and their
Interaction. London: International Accounting Standards
Board.
IASB (2008). Discussion Paper, Preliminary Views on
Amendments to IAS 19 Employee Benefits. London:
International Accounting Standards Board.
IASC (1983). International Accounting Standard 19,
Accounting for Retirement Benefits in the Financial
Statements of Employers. London: International
Accounting Standards Committee.
IASC (1989). Framework for the Preparation and
Presentation of Financial Statements. London:
International Accounting Standards Committee.
IASC (1993). International Accounting Standard 19,
Retirement Benefit Costs. London: International
Accounting Standards Committee.
IASC (1998a). International Accounting Standard 19,
Employee Benefits. London: International Accounting
Standards Committee.
IASC (1998b). International Accounting Standard 37,
Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets.
London: International Accounting Standards Committee.
IASC Foundation (2002). Constitution. London:
International Accounting Standards Board.
ICAEW (1999). No Surprises: The Case for Better Risk
Reporting. London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales.
Ippolito, R.A. (1985). ‘The labor contract and true eco-
nomic pension liabilities’. American Economic Review,
75: 1031–1043.
Johnson, R.W. and Uccello, C.E. (2003). ‘Cash balance
plans and the distribution of pension wealth’. Industrial
Relations, 42: 745–773.
Khorasanee, Z. (2004). What Discount Rate Should be
Used to Value Defined Benefit Pension Liabilities?.
Discussion Paper PI-0402, The Pensions Institute, Cass
Business School.
Landsman, W. R. (1986). ‘An empirical investigation of
pension fund property rights’. Accounting Review, 61:
662–691.
Lennard, A. (2002). Liabilities and How to Account for
Them: An Exploratory Essay. London: Accounting
Standards Board
Macintosh, N.B. (2002). Accounting, Accountants and
Accountability: Poststructuralist Positions. London and
New York, NY: Routledge.
Macintosh, N.B., Shearer, T., Thornton, D.B. and Welker,
M. (2000). ‘Accounting as simulacrum and hyperreality:
perspectives on income and capital’. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 25: 13–50.
McGill, D.M., Brown, K.M., Haley, J.J. and Schieber, S.J.
(2004). Fundamentals of Private Pensions. 8th edn.,
Oxford: Oxford University Press .
Napier, C.J. (1982). Accounting for Pension Costs: An
Interim Report. London: Accounting Standards
Committee.
Napier, C.J. (1983). Accounting for the Cost of Pensions.
248 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:59
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
London: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales.
Napier, C.J. (1984). ‘Pension costs’. In Tonkin, D.J. and
L.C.L. Skerratt (eds.), Financial Reporting 1984–85: A
Survey of UK Published Accounts. London: Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (201–216).
Napier, C.J. (1986). ‘Accounting for pension scheme sur-
pluses’. Accountancy, (May) 97 (1113): 118–120.
Napier, C.J. (2007). ‘Pension accounting and fair value’, in
Walton, P. (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Fair Value
and Financial Reporting. London: Routledge (340–349).
Napier, C.J. and Power, M.K. (1992). ‘Professional re-
search, lobbying and intangibles: a review essay’.
Accounting and Business Research, 23: 85–95.
Nobes, C.W. (2003). Liabilities and their Measurement in
UK and International Accounting Standards. London:
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants.
PAAinE (2008). Discussion Paper, The Financial
Reporting of Pensions. Brussels: European Financial
Reporting Advisory Group.
Pilch, M. and Wood, V. (1979). Pension Schemes. London:
Gower Press.
Ryan, R.J. and Fabozzi, F.J. (2002). ‘Rethinking pension li-
abilities and asset allocation’. Journal of Portfolio
Management, 28(4): 7–15.
Sharpe, W.F. (1976). ‘Corporate pension funding policy’.
Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 183–193.
Stone, M.E. (1984). ‘The pension accounting myth’.
Accounting Historians Journal, 11 (2): 19–38.
Thomas, P.B. and Williams, P.F. (2009). ‘Cash balance
pension plans: a case of standard-setting inadequacy’.
Critical Perspectives in Accounting, 20: 228–254.
Tweedie, D. (2005). ‘Speech by Sir David Tweedie,
Chairman, International Accounting Standards Board’.
Dinner hosted by the Financial Reporting Council, the
Business Council of Australia, the Australian Institute of
Company Directors, and the Australian Stock Exchange,
Sydney, Thursday, 15 August 2002. http://www.frc.gov.au/
speeches/tweedie_speech.asp (downloaded 17 October
2008).
Tweedie, D. (2007). ‘Can global standards be principle
based?’ Journal of Applied Research in Accounting and
Finance, 2(1): 3–8.
Zeff, S.A. (1978). ‘The rise of “economic consequences”’.
Journal of Accountancy (Dec.), 146(6): 56–63.
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 249
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 19
:59
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
